Step out in search of free will and you encounter many traps.

Say you make the astute claim that something free must be something uncaused. The way you see it, if something is predetermined it cannot be free. If we witness a free act, we must be witnessing something that has no prior cause.

As reasonable as this seems, and as dapper as the logic might appear, it turns out false. If I make a free choice, then I *caused* something. And so there most certainly is causation in free will, it’s just that *I* am the cause—not my brain, not my values, not my personality, but *me*.

What do I mean by *me*?
What do I mean when I say: “I caused something”?

Guided by the concierge of common sense, all I can really mean by *me* is this physical instantiation of myself.

My body.

So then clever folks are likely to launch their probes at the physical self: where does this physical thing, the body, enact its causes? As of this writing, the brain remains the top candidate for inquiry. But what part of the brain?

At this point you begin to suspect you’ve been lulled into a trap. When looking at a material thing, all you can see is a chain of events—that is, you see determinism. The absolute best thing you could hope for, when peering into your microscope, would be to witness something happen that shows no regard to any chain of events around it—that is, you see indeterminism.

And now you know for sure you’ve been trapped, because neither of these possible outcomes—determinism or indeterminism—are free will.

Something determined is not free, and neither is something un-determined. A free choice is not determined by the chain-of-events—even of the brain. It’s determined by *me*. A free choice is also not un-determined, because that would just be randomness. But when I make a free choice, I *determine* something.

The bait of this trap sits back in the lap of common sense, the cogent claim that “all a person can really mean by *me* is this physical instantiation of ourselves.”

For free will to be true, this common sense claim must be false. In other words, given the harsh binary of matter, between determinism and indeterminism—neither capable of yielding free will—the only way out of the trap is to consider a more classic hypothesis: we are each more than matter. In other words, free will requires dualism. It requires something more than brains, bodies, neurons, or microtubules.

This solution comes with its own basket of problems, I know, but it’s the only way.